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The aim of this paper is to explore possible measures to assess welfare changes resulting from 
alternative risk communication policies drawing on previous work on welfare losses due to incorrect 
risk perceptions. A review of the literature analysing models of risk information processing point out 
the role of Bayesian updating processes in modelling changing risk perceptions. On the other hand 
welfare analysis of the consequences of action undertaken under ignorance suggest possible measures 
of the benefits of improved risk communication. An illustrative example of welfare losses due to poor 
information is provided using the classical data set on milk contamination in Ohau (Hawaii). Welfare 
measures are obtained comparing the real observed behaviour with an hypothetical risk perception 
pattern induced by a more effective risk communication policy. 
 
1. Introduction 
The way in which consumers judge food safety and make food choices can change dramatically 
in situations of crisis such as those occurring in case of a food scare (e.g. BSE) or a food poisoning 
outbreak (e.g. e-coli). The release of information about a food crisis is likely to cause a fall in demand 
for that food. Depending on the way governments and food industries react to market failures of this 
sort through risk communication and depending on consumer trust in the sources of risk information, 
demand will take a certain amount of time to re-adjust after the downturn following the crisis. One of 
the main issues associated with the time necessary for demand to re-adjust is the speed of adjustment, 
with subsequent problems of misallocation of resources and welfare losses for both producers and 
consumers. In the case of a food scare or poisoning outbreak, both consumer trust in risk information 
sources and effective communication are likely to play a significant role in bringing back perceived 
risk to the ‘normal’ level existing before the crisis occurred. Perceived risk, in turn, influences the way 
in which demand re-adjusts after the drop occurred as a consequence of the crisis.  
The aim of this paper is to explore possible measures to assess welfare changes resulting from 
alternative risk communication policies drawing on previous work on welfare losses due to incorrect 
risk perceptions. The paper takes the following structure. We start with reviewing some of the 
literature analysing models of risk information processing, then move , in section 3, to the impact of 
changing risk perceptions on demand and analysis of the welfare implications of imperfect risk 
information. In section 4 we provide an example of how welfare losses  due to risk misperceptions can 
be calculated from the same data used to estimate demand curves. Finally, concluding remarks can be 
find in section 5.  
2. Models of risk information processing 
One of the main causes of shift in demand shift due to the occurrence of a food scare is the 
change in the perception of risk across consumers. Most papers that deal with demand shifts following 
a food safety crisis analyse risk information processing within a Bayesian learning framework either as 
                                                 
•  Research supported by the European Commission Quality of Life Programme, Key Action 1(Health, Food & 
Nutrition); contract QLK1-CT-2002-02343; Project Title “Food Risk Communication and Consumers’ Trust in 
theFood Supply Chain”  coordinated by Prof. Donato Romano (University of Florence). a stand alone process or as a consequence of information flows mainly triggered by the media. In 
Bocker and Hanf’s (2000) paper for example, consumers are Bayesian agents that update their prior 
beliefs about supplier reliability following news of product failure. Liu et al. (1998) and  Smith & 
Johnson (1988) rely upon the prospective reference theory firstly proposed by Viscusi (1979) by 
which ex post perceived risk is a weighted average of ex ante perceived risk and stated (or sample) 
risk estimates based on new information.  
When information about a food crisis is first released, perceived risk suddenly rises and remains 
high even after the hazard has been removed or dealt with. Studies examining the impact of risk 
information on food purchase show that negative information released by the media has an immediate 
negative effect on sales, whereas positive media coverage does not seem to have any effect on sales 
(see for example Smith et al., 1988). Liu et al. (1998), on the other hand, argue that it is not 
necessarily true that positive media coverage does not generate any effect on risk perceptions, but 
rather that the effect of positive information is likely to be delayed over time. The authors analyse the 
effects of positive and negative information separately and find that such effects are asymmetrical. 
Information effects’ asymmetry is due to the fact that while consumers tend to react instantly to 
negative information about food risks, immediately modifying their consumption decisions, they take 
time to assess the reliability of positive information. As a consequence, positive information has a 
delayed effect over time on consumption decisions, with consumer trust in the positive information 
provided (e.g. by governments) playing a key role and, presumably, being able to influence the speed 
with which demand will re-adjust. Positive and trusted information “can help adjust the subjective risk 
down to the normal (objective) level” (Liu et al. 1998). Conversely, distrust slows down the process 
by which risk perceptions return back to “normal” levels.  
The model applied by Liu et al. (1998) analyses the impact of both positive and negative food 
risk information on consumption decisions in two steps. First, the way in which risk perceptions vary 
as new information becomes available to consumers is modelled as an “updating process of risk 
perceptions to media coverage” analogous to a Bayesian decision process in which a temporal 
adjustment component is included. Subsequently, a demand adjustment equation is estimated based on 
risk perception changes. The starting point is the prospective reference model developed by Viscusi 
(1989), in which current perceived risk is expressed as the weighted average of the risk perceived prior 
to a shock (ex ante) and perceived risk after receiving new information (ex post). Thus for an 
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If positive and negative information effects are included assuming asymmetry of such effects, 
thus incorporating a temporal adjustment process, equation (1) can be written as: 




it , , 1 − − − + = θ ω    k,j  =  0,1,2,…     (2) 
Time can play a further role in the process of moving back to a state of normality, with the impact 
of information fading as time elapses (Kask and Maani, 1992).  
Böcker and Hanf (2000) incorporate consumer trust in suppliers’ reliability as a new variable in 
the Bayesian model describing the temporal updating of risk perceptions and then estimate the impact 
of risk perception changes on demand. 
Smith and Johnson (1988) use a modified form of a Bayesian learning model to describe the way 
in which individuals use risk information to change their risk perceptions. Such model shows that 
newly introduced information about the risks of radon concentration in homes and their water supply 
is “about a third as important as their [the individuals’] prior beliefs in forming a posterior risk 
assessment”.  
Smallwood and Blaylock (1991) also point out the need for a framework able to look at the 
dynamic nature of risk perceptions and their influence on demand over time, albeit taking a slightly 
different viewpoint. The authors argue that demand models generally assume that costs and benefits of 
any action occur instantaneously and are fully known, whereas this is not always the case with food safety issues. For example, the benefits of a balanced nutrition are likely to occur after a long-time and 
may be difficult to measure. At the same time,  a delay in the onset of consequences from consumption 
of hazardous goods is found to be one of the factors influencing risk perceptions together with the 
severity, reversibility and incidence of consequences (Slovic., 1987).  
Ippolito (1981) develops a model to analyse the way in which changes in information about the 
safety of a good affect its consumption over time. The model’s basic assumption is that in the absence 
of risk, consumption will be stable at a certain level throughout the consumer’s life. The release of 
information about the risks involved in consuming a certain product has three possible effects on 
demand depending on the nature of the hazard and the effect of the hazard on individuals’ survival. 
The first case is that of hazards for which the probability of survival is inversely related to the 
cumulative level of consumption (e.g. alcohol consumption). The second case is that of instantaneous 
effect of the hazard, in which the probability of survival is entirely determined by the current level of 
consumption (e.g. botulism, e-coli). The third case is that of ‘delayed effect’ in which current 
consumption does not affect current survival, but survival after a number of years (e.g. cancer linked 
to intake of pesticide residues present in foods). In all three cases consumption drops to either a very 
low level or to zero to pick up again after a certain period of time as determined by two opposing 
effects: the age effect and the discount effect. In the first case, the older a consumer, the higher the 
consumption of a hazardous good will be, as lost utility from future consumption reduces with age. In 
the second case, increased consumption is expected to reduce survivability and, hence, to diminish 
utility from future consumption. The question of welfare implications within such framework remains, 
however, open, as it does the issue of trust in information sources. 
Up to this point we have mainly concentrated on the analysis of economics literature. 
Psychologists have also extensively studied changes in individuals’ risk perceptions and the impact of 
media coverage on the formation of such perceptions. Parallelisms exist between models developed by 
economists and those proposed by psychologists (see for example Liu et al., 1998, p.692). In the next 
section the welfare implication of changing risk perception and misperceptions will be illustrated. 
3. Welfare analysis 
In the context of food safety, welfare losses result not only from deterioration of objective food 
safety but also from misallocation of resources induced by biased perceptions about the level of safety  
(Foster and Just, 1989; Swartz and Strand, 1981). In the next sub section a welfare analysis framework 
for this type of market failure will be illustrated drawing on the existing literature. Subsequently some 
extensions will be explored with reference to the dynamic nature of the welfare change and the 
possible presence of interrelated markets. 
3.1 Imperfect information about food safety and welfare analysis 
A first classification of welfare losses due to 
a deterioration of food safety is provided by 
Swartz and Strand (1981) that classify losses in 
“unavoidable” and “needless”. The former o
when consumers are perfectly informed and thei
welfare is reduced by an objective lowering o
some food safety index. The latter are due to 
imperfect information about the actual level of 
food safety so that resources are misalloca
consumed quantities are higher or lower than 
they would be if the consumer had perfect 
information (e.g. consumers avoid consuming 
food that is safe believing that it is risky). This 
type of losses deserves particularly attention, 
especially when risk communication policies 
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Fig. 1 Welfare losses associated with demand 





A first measure of needless losses is 
provided by Swartz and Strand with reference to a case of seafood contamination in the USA. In the case investigated by the authors, consumers living 
in an area far away from the place where contamination occurred incorrectly believe that the safety of 
seafood is jeopardized and reduce the level of consumption thus incurring in welfare losses. The 
welfare loss deriving from such erroneous beliefs is given by the difference between the total surplus 
area (given by the sum of consumer and producer surplus) under perfect information and the total 
surplus area under imperfect information as it is illustrated in figure 1. The higher curve (d*) refers to 
the demand of safe food under perfect information, whereas the lower curve refers to demand in a 
situation of imperfect information.  
However, the Swartz and Strand's measure seems to be affected by the so called paradox of bliss 
ignorance. To illustrate the problem we take into consideration the case in which a reduction in the 
level of food safety is underestimated by consumers. 
In this case, the paradox goes that, the welfare level in condition of ignorance could be higher 
than the measure obtained in the informed state (thus ignorance is bliss) as the demand curve would 
shift downwards when correct information were released. Foster and Just (1989) point out that a 
welfare measurement related to choices made under ignorance should be always referred to a perfect 
information state. Indeed, the paradox disappears as soon as welfare is measured in condition of 
perfect information revealing that choices made under ignorance were not optimal given the actual 
state of the world.   
This point is illustrated in figure 2 where θ* represents the objective level of a safety parameter 
whereas θ is the subjectively perceived level of the same parameter. In the case of an improvement 
with underestimation of the safety level the observed demand curve d (function of price (p), perceived 
safety (θ) and income (m)) lies under the curve d* that would be observed in condition of perfect 
elfare losses due to ignorance is given by th
between the informed demand and supply curve 
on the right of the (lower) quantity actually 
exchanged. 
Although consum
information. Thus, the correct measure of needless w e area 
er surplus is a widely used 
mea




y were in 
e 
lling 
sure of welfare change, it is well known that 
such a measure is only an approximation of the 
true change in consumer welfare (Willig, 1976). 
Rather, equivalent or compensating surplus or 
variation should be used as correct welfare 
measures.  
Below 
pensating and equivalent variation adop
by Foster and Just (1989) which use reversed 
signs with respect to the usual ones. Whereas 
Foster and Just (1989) analyse a case of reduce
safety following food contamination, in this 
paper  reference is made to some action that 
restores safety levels at the pre-contamination
state. In this context, compensating variation measures the amount of money (in this case negative) 
that should be added to income in order to keep consumers as well off after the change as the
the original state provided that they are free to adapt their consumption choices to the new situation 
(that is, in case of improved safety, they can expand their consumption of the safer food). In the sam
context, Foster and Just (1989) define compensating surplus as the amount consumers will be wi
to pay when they cannot change their consumption pattern following the change but are forced to 
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Fig. 2 Welfare losses associated with demand 
shifts according to Foster and Just The corresponding equivalent measures 
consider as the baseline utility the utility 
consumers experience after the recovery of the
pre-contamination safety level. Thus, equivalent 
variation measures the minimum amount 
consumers will be willing to accept in order to 
forego the change towards the pre-contamination 
state when they can adapt their consumption 
bundle to the new, improved, situation. Again 
according to Foster and Just (1984), equivalent 
surplus would measure the change in welfare w
the consumption bundle is constrained to the level 
of consumption that would have been chosen in 




. As the authors underline, 
this l d 
y 
urns 
 time t2. Now, let the subjectively perceived level of safety be represented by the 
dotted line in the same figure. As communication about the objective level of risk is not completely 
trust  
 safety level is θ2 , still lower than the 
objective level θ*.  
)
evel of consumption would not be observe
either before or after the safety change if 
information is incorrect. Thus a possible 
alternative measure should take again as a 
reference the initial level of consumption while 
maintaining as baseline utility the post-change level. 
Drawing on Foster and Just (1989), these measures can be applied to the study of need less 
welfare losses as well. Suppose that the objective level of food safety changes following the time 
pattern illustrated by the solid line in fig 3. At time t1 an outbreak causes a drop in the level of safet
from θ*to θ1. As the government intervenes to solve the problem, the objective level of safety ret
back to normality at
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Fig. 3 Subjective perceptions and objective 
level of food safety in a food scare 
ed, the perceived safety recovers to the initial level more slowly and lags behind the objective
level for some time. For example, at time t2  the perceived
Taking as reference the utility (U*) at time t3 with safety level equal to θ*, the compensating 
variation for a change in safety from θ2 to θ* is given by: 
() 2 *, , U p e CV θ = ( 2 2, , U p e θ −          ( 3 )  
where e(p,θ,U*) is the minimum expendit el 
θ.  If at safety level θ2 the optimal consumption of  food is x , then the compensating surplus for a 
change from θ2 to θ* is: 
ure needed to attain utility U2 at price p and safety lev
2
() () 2 2 2 2 * , , , , ~ U p e x x U p e CS θ θ − = =          ( 4 )  
where  () , , 2 2
~ x = x U p e θ rained expenditure function indicating the minimum 
expenditure needed to attain utility U2, given safety level θ, price p and consumption of qua
 is the const
  ntity x =
x2. As the value of a constrained minimization problem is never lower than the value of the 
unconstrained problem,  () 2 2 , , ~ x x U p e = θ  is greater than or equal to e(p,θ,U2) and , consequently CV
≤ CS .  Intuitively, the welfare improvement related to a change of safety level from θ2 to θ*>θ2 is 
lower whenever consumers are "forced" to consume the same quantity of food they consumed in th
lower safety state. Thus they will pay a smalle
 
e 
r amount of money to obtain the change with respect to 
the c
ty lowers consumers' welfare gain. 
ase when they are free to adapt their consumption (that is a smaller negative amount of money 
needs to be added to income in order to keep utility at the original level). Indeed, an improvement in 
food safety is likely to increase consumption of the safer food and the impossibility to exploit this 
opportuniThe needless welfare loss in the case depicted above can be measured by the cost of ignoran
(COI), a measure first developed by Foster and Just (1984, 1989), given by the difference between C
and CV: 
() () * * 2 * * , , , , ~ U p e x x U p e COI θ θ − = =        ( 5 )  
COI measures the welfare losses that consumers bear since at time t2 they don't choose the 
optimal consumption level of food given the objective safety level θ* . Rather, believing that safety 
level is θ2 instead of θ* they are likely to consume a lower quantity of the food (x2) giving raise to a 
needless welfare loss. Noticeably, as in the case of the total surplus loss illustrated in fig. 2, 
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 an extension of the framework illustrated in the previous section is the 
anal e of 
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umer welfare is measured under condition of improved information by comparing the 
consequence of informed actions  with those of misinformed ones (i.e. consumption of quantity x2). In 
this situation, COI is an ex post measure of the value of better information stemming from the partial 
removal of self-protection activities such as avoiding consumption of unhealthy food and self-
insurance activities aimed to reduce the prospective severity of the health consequences.  
COI measures have been applied to a number of cases. Teisl et al. (2001) use the framework to 
evaluate the welfare impact of nutrition information using scanner data from a field experiment in the 
USA. Mazzocchi and Stefani (2002) provide a COI measure for withheld information referring to the 
BSE scare in Italy. Another recent application of the COI measure is an experimental work 
et al. (2002) about the value of
measures of COI can also be obtained within t
els used to analyse discrete choices. While decision theory provides well established measures o
the ex post value of information messages (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992) , the investigation of COI in
the literature on random utility and choice experiments is a relatively recent and promising 
development (Leggett, 2002). 
3.2 Possible extensions of the framework 
The framework illustrated in the previous subsection, can be enriched considering a number of 
interrelated markets rather than the single market of the affected food and evaluating the effects of 
different degrees of inflexibility on both the supply and the demand side of the markets. A furthe
of investigation leading to
ysis of the dynamic nature of the adjustment process. As ineffective risk communication is on
the causes of the slow adjustment back to objective perceptions of safety, the longer consumers 
overreact to a food safety crisis (that is the longer it is the interval between t1 and t3 in figure 3) the
 to produce and exchange lower than the 
points in a welfare analysis framework. A 
en (1990) that analyses the dynamic effects of
dity future markets. The temporal pattern 
followed by prices
optimal quantity of food. 
There is a paucity of literature investigating these
noticeable exception is the work of Rausser and Walra






of the markets is evaluated by means of
dynamic welfare analysis whereby welfare 
losses occurred in each period are disco
and summed up to give the present value of 
welfare changes.  
In this model the producer side of the 
market is taken into account as well within a 
partial equilibrium analysis of market 
behaviour and related welfare changes. As for 
the case of biased risk perception, external 
shocks cause unexpected demand shifts awa
from the long run equilibrium level that in turn
misplace production decisions causing welfare 
x 
1   
x  x  0    
Fig. 4 Welfare losses due to inaccuracy of 
forward prices losses. This is the same misallocation problem investigated in speculative markets where optimal 
resource allocation depends on the accuracy of forward price at the time production decisions are 
taken (Stein, 1981). The welfare losses are similar to those illustrated in the safety change context. 
Again, it is the shift of the demand curve relative to the forecasts that causes the losses but now 
rationing is determined by the lower quantity supplied (fig. 4). For example, farmers allocate farm area
to a crop in order to p
 
roduce quantity x0 as they expect demand d1 to occur (following the observation 
of fu t  






ptured by the value of some marketable asset (Freeeman III, p.203-207). 
This
e to a 
dyna
In order to illustrate how needless losses  can be meas
alternative risk communication strategies, we have reprodu st 








ture prices at the time decision is taken). Subsequently, an external shock shifts demand to d2 bu
production decision can no longer be changed, thus underproduction and higher prices result leading 
to the welfare loss given by the shaded triangle. 
If markets are linked, shocks in one market lead to different degrees of disequilibrium in other 
markets depending on the relative flexibility of supply across a numbe
tablished. To some extent this model could be applied to food scares as well, especially when 
supply elasticities vary across substitute goods . Indeed, so far, COI measures has been investigated 
only from the consumer point of view and within a static framework. 
As risk communication policies shape the pattern according to which risk perception and food 
consumption return to normality, the welfare impact of these policies need to take into account the 
temporal dimension of the adjustment and its impact on welfare. This may be approximated by th
accumulated sum of welfare losses resulting in each period from misallocation of resources due to
biased perceptions. To some extent this is only an approximate measure as it does not consider what 
has been termed by Keen (1990) the intertemporal compensating variation that is the maximum 
amount individuals would be willing to pay in order to reallocate expenditure (and utility) across 
periods.  A correct measure of intertemporal welfare change should be given by the compensating 
equivalent variation in the initial wealth. However, such measures are not available from market data
unless welfare change is ca
 is not usually the case of food safety changes. In such context  the present  or future value of 
single period changes seems to be the only feasible alternative that can be relied upon to assess risk 
communication policies.   
In the following section an example of how needless losses can be measured with referenc
hypothetical communication action will be provided. Unlike previous applications of COI, the 
mic nature of the adjustment process will be explicitly taken into account. 
4. Needless losses: an illustration of the COI calculation for an hypothetical case  
ured in the context of the assessment of 
ced some of the findings of  Foster and Ju
d by S. Liu . The purpose of such exercis
is to show how a measure of the 
welfare effects of  a risk communication 
policy can be calculated. Of course, t
implementation of the policy is 
hypothetical, the only aim of the exercise 
being methodological. The database
contains price, income and consumption 
data about a case of milk  contamination 
with heptachlor, a highly toxic and 
carginogen pesticide, that occurred in the 
island of Ohau (Hawaii) in 1982. 
Inhabitants of the island became aware of
the contamination by mid March 1982. 
soon as the news of contamination spre
milk consumption dropped dramatical
(Fig. 5). Although, starting from May, 
media news became encouraging and 









1981  1982 
US Gallons/Day 
Hawaii (Foster and Just, 1989) 
5000 
1978  1979  1980 normality, consumers remained wary for a longer time and pre-contamination levels of milk 
consumption were recovered only one year later. In that occasion public authorities were criticised fo
delaying the disclosure of information to consumers thus providing the case for the measurement of 
the cost of ignorance.  Besides Foster and Just, the Oahu case was studied by other authors (Smith et 
al., 1988; Liu et al., 1998) that mainly focussed on modelling the impact of media news on risk
perception and , consequently , on demand shifts.  Our  focus is rather on assessing the needless losse
due to the slow recovery of milk consumption to normal levels after the scare. Drawing on the paper 
by Foster and Just we estimated the Hawaii milk demand curve and recovered the indirect utility and 
cost functions to obtain CS and CV measure for different levels of perceived food safety (alternatively





Stefani (2002) and Teisl et al. (2001)). Following Foster and Just (1989r), a semilog specification of 
the milk demand was adop
 single valued index f(θt) 
summarises the impact of the perceived safety level (θ) on milk demand. The semilog functional form 
and the associated direct and indirect utilities have two desirable properties: 
ted. Demand is thus represented by the function: 
()
t t p m
t t e f x
α γ θ
− =           ( 6 )  
where xt represents monthly per capita milk consumption (in half gallon units), mt real per capita 
income (in 1967 US dollars) and pt is milk price (dollars per half gallon). The
0 > ∂ ∂ f U ,  0 > ∂ ∂ f V  and  0 > ∂ ∂ θ f  
f and x satisfy weak complementarity (if  x=0 then  0 = ∂ ∂ f U ) 
The first property assures that perception of increasing safety levels positively affects utility a
demand for milk . The second implies that when consumption is zero no further losses in utility occ
following a deterioration of the sa
nd 
ur 
fety level. The expenditure function that Foster and Just (1989) 
retrieved from this demand specification (let aside multiplicative constants) adopting the Hausman 
(1981) procedure is of the form: 
()  
  + +







= U p e t t t γ
θ ln ) , , (        ( 7 )  
he index 
f(θ) compatible with the semilog form of the demand function and capable to account for the varying 
time pattern of milk consumption during the crisis (that is sudden fall 
for some constant K. 
Moreover, Foster and Just (1984, 1989) provided a dummy variable specification for t
and slow recovery): 
{ }




April A March M t
p
t D t b D a D a d Ae f
− + + + + = δ θ
β      
where A is a constant; p1 is the price of fruit nectar considered as a milk substitute; dt is a 
dummies for months when school is in session;  Dmarch and Dapril are dummies for the months where th
safety level changes while D* =1 for any month following disclosure of information (May 1982 and 
subsequent months) and 0 otherwise; t indexes months starting from May '82 with t=0, June '82 with 
t=1 and so on; A, β, δ, aM, aA, b and c are unknown parameters. Provided that c >0, the term b(1+t)
-c 
tends to zero as time elapses thu
( 8 )  
e 
s capturing the slow recovery of demand after the dramatic drop in the 
after
Mo ta December  9 ed to es m n with 
non linear least squares. -The estim ts lows (t s ar
 xt=  m t 
.57) 
 -0.751DMarch -1.831DApril -0.776  D_Start *(1+t) 
78 R
2=.97 
 (-14.63)  (-35.73)  (-16.20)  (-10.28)   
math of contamination news. Noticeably, greater values of c account for faster pace of recovery of 
consumption to normal levels. 
nthly da  from  1977 to June 1
ated coefficien
83 were us




entheses)  p : 
ln .990  +.000970  t -0.766  pt +0.007  p1t +0.095  d
 (1.37)  (0.58)  (-1.97)  (0.04) 
-0.5
(6The estimated f(θ) captures the effect of 
the media coverage of the scare on consumers' 
risk perceptions. In order to provide an 
example of how alternative risk c
patterns impact on consumer welfare an 
artificial series of milk consumption was 
created setting to –1.35 the exponent of the 
(1+t) term of the index. The value is arbit
taken from the range that generates a faster 
adjustment process. In figure 6 the fitted values 
of the original demand equation (x ˆ ) and  ho
of the artificial one (
* x ) are shown. As it was 
expected the greater the value of c the faster t
recovery of consumption to normal levels.
pattern could be considered the (hypothetical) 






For each month following May 1982 the two different level of milk consumption (  and  ) 
corre









1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
x ˆ
* ˆ x  
Monthly per capita consumption of milk (half gallons) 




* spond to subjective perceptions of milk safety θ ˆ and 
* θ  respectively. It is assumed that θ is a 
better approximation of the objective safety levels, given the higher value of c. Therefore, consumers 
behaving under ignorance incur in needless welfare losses given by the Cost of Ignorance illustrated 
by equation 5. Even if this is only an illustrative simulation, there are reasons to believe that actually 
consumers overreacted to the food scare and that the return to normality was too slow with respect to 
the objective conditions of safety (see Liu, (1998)). 
The expenditure functional form (7) leads to the
ge from θ ˆ to 
* θ  (Foster and Just, 1989): 
() ( ) ()  

 
 + − =
− − 1 ˆ ln
1 ˆ ˆ *
* * p m p m e f e f CV
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thetical, the only aim of the exercise is to 
show
xplored the welfare effects of suboptimal temporal adjustment of risk 
perc er 
e 
 value which is given by the difference between CS and CV. The value of per capita milk 
consumption in 1967 dollars given in the last column of the table (VMC), assess the relative 
importance of needless losses. Besides single period welfare losses, the accumulated amount 
values at an interest rate of 5% is shown. Given the ex post nature of the COI ( consumers become 
aware of their losses only once they are fully informed), a future value rather than a present value of
the flow of compensating amounts seems more appropriate. 
 Of course, as the modified consumption pattern is hypo
 how the COI measure can be implemented in a real-like case to assess the impact of alternative 
risk communication strategies. To this purpose a sensible simulation of the impact of risk 
communication on food demand is required.  
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have e
eption. Drawing from the literature about welfare impact of misallocation of consumption und
ignorance, a measure of the overall welfare change induced by risk communication policies is 
proposed. As such policies affect the way in which risk perceptions change over a certain time span, it 
is possible to compute single period welfare losses corresponding to consumption choices made in a 
situation of poor information relative to an improved information status. The ex post cost of ignoranc
is given by the difference between compensating surplus (calculated holding constant the consumption bundle as it is chosen under ignorance) and 
compensating variation. Single period measu
can subsequently be accumulated to provide an 
overall present or future value measure of the 
impact of risk communication.  
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July -0.49  -0.55 0.06 0.99
Augu -0.50  -0.57 0.06 1.06
Septemb -0.55  -0.62 0.06 1.18
October -0.54  -0.60 0.06 1.27
Novembe -0.52  -0.58 0.05 1.23
December -0.51  -0.56 0.05 1.21
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March -0.47  -0.51 0.04 1.36
April -0.47  -0.51 0.04 1.30
May -0.46  -0.49 0.04 1.33
June -0.41  -0.44 0.03 1.08
     
P  C 0   
 
lated for a case where the demand shift 
induced by changing risk perceptions is estim
ex post by means of a simplified functional form 
and using observed data from a milk 
contamination scare. Other works on t
food scare (Liu et al., 1998; Smith et. al. 1988) 
try to analyse the impact of different types of 
information (such as positive vs. negative med
news) on demand. By pursuing this strand of 
research it is possible to build up models that 
relate demand shifts to a number of social 
variables that in turn can be targeted by spe
communication actions. Social psychologists 
have already explored these issues within the 
framework of social amplification of risk (Ren
et al., 1992). As it was stressed in section 2 the 
parallelism between models developed by 
psychologists and economists need further 
investigation in order to provide reliable 
assessment of the welfare effect of risk 
communication policies. 
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